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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE HEARSAY
RULE: A PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP IN NEED OF A
PRACTICAL ANALYSIS
JOEL R. BROWN
A FREQUENTLY arising problem in criminal litigation in-
volves the relationship between the exceptions to the hearsay
rule and the sixth amendment confrontation clause. The origin of
this problematic relationship can easily be traced. The express lan-
guage of the confrontation clause guarantees that the accused has
the right to confront witnesses against him. The effect of a strict
application of the confrontation clause is diametrically opposed to
the introduction of evidence under a hearsay rule exception.
In this Comment, the author focuses primarily on how the fed-
eral courts have dealt with this conflict. A brief history of the con-
frontation clause and the hearsay rule is followed by a discussion
of Ohio v. Roberts,1 an important 1980 Supreme Court decision pu-
tatively promulgating a functional, uniform standard for approach-
ing the confrontation problem. After discussing how the Florida
and federal courts dealt with the Roberts standard, the author ex-
amines United States v. Inadi, a recent Supreme Court case that
partially rejects Roberts. This decision's likely effect on future con-
frontation challenges is also discussed.
I. HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY
EVIDENCE
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in part that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right .. . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." In 1965, the Supreme Court applied the confrontation
clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment.4 Addition-
ally, almost every state constitution contains a similar provision.5
In Mattox v. United States,6 an 1895 Supreme Court decision,
Mattox argued that at his second trial-which resulted from an
appeal and remand-the court should exclude testimony given by
1. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
2. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
5. Collected at 5 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (rev. ed. 1974). Florida's confrontation
clause is found in FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
6. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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two witnesses who had died since testifying at his first trial.
Though both witnesses had been fully cross-examined at the for-
mer trial, the defendant charged that admitting the testimony in-
fringed on his sixth amendment right of confrontation.'
In permitting the introduction of the testimony, the Supreme
Court explained the two-fold purpose underlying the confrontation
clause. First, it affords the defendant an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the witness, thereby allowing the defendant to test the wit-
ness' memory and possibly elicit some information that might aid
in his defense. Second, it gives the jury an opportunity to observe
the witness' demeanor and determine his credibility.'
The hearsay rule is based largely on the same interests that un-
derlie the confrontation clause. In California v. Green,' the Court
noted, "The whole purpose of the Hearsay rule has been already
satisfied [because] the witness is present and subject to cross-ex-
amination [and] [t]here is ample opportunity to test him as to the
basis for his former statement." This statement of purpose is simi-
lar to the Court's explanation of the confrontation clause in
Mattox.10
The purpose of the hearsay rule and the purpose and language
of the confrontation clause apparently provide a basis for challeng-
ing practically any evidence submitted under the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. The Supreme Court, however, has refused to apply
the literal language of the confrontation clause which would effec-
tively eliminate all hearsay exceptions.11 Unfortunately, the Court
has not yet formulated a uniform standard to deal with the rela-
tionship between the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause.
Consequently, courts have been faced with confrontation chal-
lenges in a myriad of contexts with conflicting results.
7. Id. at 240, 245.
8. Id. at 242-43. The Court explained in an often-quoted passage:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases,
being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination . . . of the wit-
ness. . . in which the accused has an opportunity. . . [to compel the witness] to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by
his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.
Id.
9. 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
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II. MODERN APPLICATION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The Supreme Court has addressed the effect of the confronta-
tion clause on otherwise admissible hearsay evidence on several oc-
casions. Ohio v. Roberts"2 was a recent effort by the Supreme
Court to clarify the standards for determining when hearsay evi-
dence can be admitted without offending a defendant's confronta-
tion right.
A. Roberts and its Progeny
Roberts was charged with forging a check and possessing stolen
credit cards.' s At his trial the prosecution relied on an Ohio statute
to introduce a transcript of testimony elicited at Robert's prelimi-
nary hearing from a witness who had since become unavailable.'
The witness had left the jurisdiction and her location was un-
known. The Supreme Court ruled that the testimony could be con-
stitutionally admitted under the confrontation clause.16
In dealing with the former testimony exception to the hearsay
rule,'6 the Court noted that the confrontation clause limits the ad-
missibility of hearsay evidence in two ways. First, the clause estab-
lishes an unavailability rule. In other words, "[i]n the usual case
...the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the un-
availability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use
12. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
13. Id. at 58.
14. Id. at 59. The Ohio statute provided:
Testimony taken at an examination or a preliminary hearing at which the defend-
ant is present, or at a former trial of the cause, or taken by deposition at the
instance of the defendant or the state, may be used whenever the witness giving
such testimony dies, or cannot for any reason be produced at trial, or whenever
the witness has, since giving such testimony, become incapacitated to testify. If
such former testimony is contained within a bill of exceptions, or authenticated
transcript of such testimony, it shall be proven by the bill of exceptions, or tran-
script, otherwise by other testimony.
Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (Page 1975).
15. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 77.
16. The former testimony exception is found in FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1), which provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavaila-
ble as a witness:
(1) Former testimony
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different pro-
ceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same
or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or,
in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
1987]
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against the defendant."17 Second, to promote accuracy in the
factfinding process, the hearsay must be marked with adequate
"indicia of reliability" when the witness is shown to be
unavailable.1
The reliability prong of the Roberts test is satisfied if the evi-
dence "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."1 9 The Court
deems this dispositive of reliability. However, if the evidence does
not come under a firmly rooted exception, the proponent must
show "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to avoid exclu-
sion of the evidence.2 0
A strong majority of the federal courts of appeals have deter-
mined that the two-pronged test promulgated in Roberts applies to
a wide range of hearsay exceptions. The coconspirator exception,
which must satisfy the confrontation clause even though classified
as nonhearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence,"1 provides a good
example of how Roberts has been applied. Every circuit that has
addressed the coconspirator exception, except for one,22 either im-
pliedly or expressly has decided that such evidence must satisfy
the Roberts test before it can be properly admitted.23
In United States v. Massa,24 James Massa and Duane Skinner
had been convicted after allegedly participating in an elaborate
swindling scheme devised by Thomas Brimberry, an unindicted
coconspirator. While being investigated by the Internal Revenue
Service, Brimberry made a deal with the government resulting in
his testimony against Skinner and Massa.2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit decided that any error in admitting Brimberry's testimony
was harmless, but noted the Roberts Court clearly intended the
requisites of unavailability and reliability to be applicable in other
17. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 66.
20. Id.
21. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not hearsay if "Ithe state-
ment is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during a
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
22. The exception is the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See
United States v. Molt, 758 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986).
23. In United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986), the Supreme Court rejected the
apparent majority rule, holding that evidence submitted under the coconspirator exception
need not satisfy the Roberts unavailability prong. See infra text accompanying notes 114-25.
24. 740 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
25. Id. at 635. Brimberry lost the benefit of the deal, however, because he lied to the
grand jury. Id. at 635 n.1.
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than the former testimony context which was specifically ad-
dressed in Roberts . 6 The court reasoned that the competing inter-
ests recognized and addressed in Roberts are "implicated no mat-
ter what hearsay exception is used to justify the admission of an
out-of-court statement. 2 7 Further, the court observed that even
though Roberts only addressed hearsay exceptions, the same inter-
ests are at stake when the statements of coconspirators are admit-
ted as nonhearsay. The court concluded that "coconspirator state-
ments may be more in need of scrutiny under the confrontation
clause precisely because, unlike hearsay exceptions, they are not
admissible because of their inherent reliability. '2 8
Most of the other circuits addressing the coconspirator rule as-
sumed Roberts applied.2 9 For example, in United States v.
Bourjaily,30 the defendant argued that his right of confrontation
had been violated when the statements of his codefendant were
admitted under the coconspirator exception. Bourjaily claimed
that even if the statements satisfied the coconspirator exception
mandates, the confrontation clause required a more stringent ad-
missibility standard which was not met.31
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated
that notwithstanding its prior decisions which "held that evidence
admitted as a co-conspirator's statement . . . automatically satis-
fie[d] the sixth amendment requirements, . . . none of [those]
cases discuss[ed] the implications of the two-pronged test of Rob-
erts on [its] analysis. 382 The court then proceeded with a Roberts-
type analysis, concluding that the witness was unavailable and that
the reliability test was satisfied because the testimony fell within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ap-
parently stood alone in its refusal to apply Roberts in the cocon-
spirator exception context. In United States v. Williams," the
26. Id. at 639.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 758 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Lisotto, 722 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 (1984); United States v.
Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
30. 781 F.2d 539, 541 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 268 (1986).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 543.
33. Id. at 543-44.
34. 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1984). The court stated that "It should be plain to litigants
that absent very persuasive reasons to overrule these cases, or a command from a higher
1987]
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court did not even cite Roberts and concluded that its ruling of
admissibility under the coconspirator exception precluded any con-
frontation challenge. Subsequently, in United States v. Molt,35 the
defendant, Emerson Molt, challenged the admission of testimony
by narcotics users regarding conversations he had with alleged co-
conspirators. The court, speaking through Judge Posner, emphati-
cally explained that the coconspirator exception "makes 'a state-
ment by a coconspirator . . . during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy' admissible against [the defendant]-period." 6
The court further noted, "There is no requirement of showing that
the out-of-court declarant is unavailable, or that there is some spe-
cial reason to think the evidence is reliable. '37 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged no situation in which a confrontation clause
challenge would prevent the admission of evidence otherwise ad-
missible under the coconspirator exception.
The federal appellate courts also applied Roberts' two-pronged
test to exceptions other than the former testimony and cocon-
spirator exceptions. In Hutchins v. Wainwright,3" Michael Hutch-
ins had been convicted of armed robbery and assault with intent to
commit second degree murder. Other than the victim, only an un-
named informant-who refused to testify-could identify Hutch-
ins as the perpetrator. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit refused to admit the testimony of the unnamed
informant based on the prosecutor's failure to establish the in-
formant's unavailability or the reliability of the hearsay
statements. 9
In Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm,4" a child sexual
assault victim told two nurses and a police officer the name of the
person who had committed the crime-Wilbert Haggins. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, and Haggins filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, arguing
that his right of confrontation had been violated by admission of
the child's inculpatory statements through the police officer and
nurses. 41 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
authority, challenges to co-conspirators' statements should be based on the requirements of
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), not on the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 610.
35. 758 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986).
36. Id. at 1199 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)).
37. Id.
38. 715 F.2d 512, 514 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984).
39. Id. at 516.
40. 715 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984).
41. Id. at 1053.
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the writ after finding that the testimony satisfied the two-pronged
Roberts test. The court reasoned that the child declarant had been
declared incompetent to testify, thus she was clearly unavailable
and the excited utterance exception was deemed firmly rooted."2
In United States v. Washington,4" a county official was con-
victed of mail fraud. He purchased supplies for the county at in-
flated prices in order to receive bribes and kickbacks from the sell-
ers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed Washington's conviction, but never reached the issue of
the admissibility of the records used as evidence of the illegal kick-
back scheme. However, in dicta the court recognized that the Rob-
erts test applied when determining the admissibility of evidence
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.4" The
court suggested that "[i]f the government should again try Wash-
ington and it should again use the sellers' business records, the dis-
trict court should require adherence to the Roberts test. 4 5
In Lenza v. Wyrick,46 the Eighth Circuit applied the Roberts
test to the admission of statements under the state-of-mind excep-
tion.47 The defendant, Michael Lenza, had been convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder. At his trial, the court admitted testimony re-
42. Id. at 1053-55.
43. 688 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1982).
44. The business records exception is found in FED. R. EvID. 803(6), which provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity
A memorandum report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes busi-
ness, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted, for profit.
45. Washington, 688 F.2d at 959.
46. 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981).
47. The state-of-mind exception is found in FED. R. EVID. 803(3), which provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is available as
a witness:
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation,
or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain,
and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
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garding conversations between the witnesses and the victim and
her mother. Lenza objected to the admission of the extrajudicial
statements as hearsay and violative of his right of confrontation.48
After concluding that Roberts applied, the court determined that
the testimony had been properly admitted because the'declarants
were indisputably unavailable-some had died and the location of
the others was unknown. As to the reliability of the declarant's tes-
timony, it could be presumed because it fell within the firmly
rooted state-of-mind exception.4 9
Although no federal appellate court has addressed Roberts' ap-
plicability to the statement against interest exception to the hear-
say rule, 0 the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania in United States v. H & M, Inc.5 1 held that the
Roberts test applied to this exception. Four individuals and two
corporations had been convicted of conspiring in unreasonable re-
straint of interstate trade and commerce. On appeal, the defend-
ants challenged the admission of testimony regarding inculpatory
statements made by a declarant who had since died.52 The court
decided that the testimony could be admitted because the declar-
ant was unavailable and the circumstances accompanying the de-
clarant's statements satisfied the particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness requirement. In concluding that the statements
satisfied Roberts' reliability prong, the court emphasized that the
declarant had been subject to cross-examination."5
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identifi-
cation, or terms of declarant's will.
48. Lenza, 665 F.2d at 809-10.
49. Id. at 810.
50. The statement against interest exception is found in FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), which
provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable
as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a rea-
sonable man in his position would not have made the same statement unless he
believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborat-
ing circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
51. 562 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
52. Id. at 655, 662.
53. Id. at 669.
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The Eleventh Circuit applied Roberts in determining the admis-
sibility of testimony under Georgia's res gestae exception in Wil-
liams v. Melton. 4 Hosea Williams had been convicted of leaving
the scene of an accident without rendering aid. At trial, the judge
admitted the hearsay testimony of three witnesses to the accident
under the res gestae exception. 55 Williams filed a federal habeas
corpus petition following his conviction, and the federal district
court granted the petition based in part on a finding that admis-
sion of the hearsay evidence violated the defendant's confrontation
right."6 In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that Roberts applied and that the disputed testimony satis-
fied both the reliability and unavailability requirements. 7 The
parties had agreed that the hearsay declarant was unavailable,
thus the court needed only to test the statements under Roberts'
reliability prong. In finding that the statements satisfied the relia-
bility prong, the court emphasized the compelling circumstantial
evidence presented at trial linking Williams to the accident.,
The federal courts that invoke Roberts apply the unavailability
prong more uniformly than the reliability prong. The diverse appli-
cation of the reliability prong is due to disagreement over what
constitutes a "firmly rooted" exception.5 9 The Court in Roberts re-
cited four hearsay exceptions it considered to be firmly rooted: dy-
ing declarations, cross-examined prior testimony, and the business
and public records exceptions." The Court did not, however, inti-
54. 733 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
55. Id. at 1494. Georgia's res gestae exception provides: "When declarations part of res
gestae. Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be
free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of
the res gestae." GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-3 (1982).
56. Williams v. Melton, 568 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
57. Williams, 733 F.2d at 1496.
58. Among the evidence the court considered convincing were various documents found
in the abandoned car addressed to and from Williams as well as the car rental agreement
signed by Williams' wife. Further, an accident specialist testified that Williams' wound was
consistent with the likely pattern of impact on the driver of the abandoned car. Finally, one
of Williams' customers testified that she had given him a plastic bag of tomatoes that night
and later she had seen him leave the business with the tomatoes. A plastic bag of tomatoes
was found in the abandoned car. Id.
59. Notwithstanding the "firmly rooted" problem, the generally recognized elements of
reliability of testimony are the quality of the declarant's memory, clarity of expression, per-
ception, and sincerity. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974).
60. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
Dying declaration and cross-examined prior testimony exceptions are found in FED. R.
EVD. 804(b)(1), (2):
(b) Hearsay exceptions
1987]
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mate that the list was exhaustive, and no further guidance has
been forthcoming.
The proper classification of the coconspirator exception provides
a good example of the dissension among federal circuit courts. In
United States v. Lurz,61 the defendant, Raymond Lurz, had been
convicted of conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and possess
phencyclidine (PCP). The trial court had admitted coconspirator
statements implicating Lurz. e2 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held
that statements under the coconspirator exception are per se ad-
missible without violating the confrontation clause."3 The court
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavaila-
ble as a witness:
(1) Former testimony
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different pro-
ceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same
or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or,
in a civil action proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement under belief of impending death
In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action proceeding, a statement made
by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause
or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death.
Business and public records exceptions are found in FED. R. EviD. 803(6), (8):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes busi-
ness, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.
(8) Public records and reports
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices
or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an inves-
tigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the source of informa-
tion or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
61. 666 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982).
62. Id. at 80.
63. Id. at 80-81.
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also intimated that once a statement falls under an exception, it is
per se admissible without showing any indicia of reliability after
the unavailability prong has been satisfied." Other circuits have
adopted this per se approach with little or no elaboration. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
disagreed with the presumed reliability of evidence which satisfied
the coconspirator exception. In United States v. Ordonez,66 Ger-
man Hernandez-Garcia and Oscar Ordonez had been convicted of
conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine after the trial court
admitted ledgers implicating them in illegal transactions. The
prosecution was unable to identify the persons who had made sev-
eral entries into the ledger. Further, the prosecution failed to es-
tablish that the unidentified persons were unavailable to testify or
even that a good faith effort had been made to secure their
testimony.6 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the per se ad-
missibility of statements satisfying the coconspirator exception,
concluding that the hearsay exception requirements and the con-
frontation clause requirements are not identical. The court ex-
plained that
[iun determining whether the Confrontation Clause has been vio-
lated where a co-conspirator's statement is offered, a trial court
must find that the circumstances under which the statements
were made present a sufficient "indicia of reliability" so that "the
trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement. '68
Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Lurz, the Ninth Circuit required a
showing of reliability in conjunction with unavailability in order to
satisfy the confrontation clause.
64. The court bluntly stated: "The Lurz statements came in under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E)
as exceptions to the hearsay rule. So admitted, they do not violate the confrontation
clause." Id.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfe, 766 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1379 (1986); Boone v. Marshall, 760 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Molt, 758
F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986); United States v. Peacock, 654
F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
66. 737 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 802.
68. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
19871
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Courts rejecting the per se reliability approach largely rely on
the analysis suggested in Dutton v. Evans.9 In Dutton, Alex Evans
had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. A fellow
prisoner of Venson Williams, one of Evans' accomplices, had tes-
tifed for the prosecution at Evans' trial.7 Defense counsel objected
to Williams' testimony as hearsay and violative of Evans' right of
confrontation and sought a writ of habeas corpus, which the dis-
trict court denied. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the de-
fendant's confrontation right had been violated. 1
In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court identified four
factors that it considered pertinent in determining the reliability of
hearsay testimony submitted under the coconspirator exception:
(1) whether the statement contained assertions of past fact, (2)
whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the identity and
role of the other participants in the crime, (3) whether it was possi-
ble that the declarant's statement was based on faulty recollection,
and (4) whether the circumstances under which the statements
were made provided reason to believe that the declarant had mis-
represented the defendant's role in the crime. Courts applying
this reliability analysis have largely recognized that all of the listed
factors need not be present to support a confrontation clause
challenge. 3
The Third and Eighth Circuits took the interesting position that
the coconspirator exception is not only not a firmly rooted excep-
tion, it is not an exception at all. In United States v. Ammar, 4
Judith Ammar and others had been convicted of conspiracy for the
importation and distribution of heroin. Two of the defendants
pleaded guilty and testified for the prosecution. 75 The Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the testimony but
noted that the "coconspirator statements are not technically hear-
69. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Two deciiions applying the Dutton analysis are United States v.
Ammar, 714 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983), and United States v.
Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 77. The witness testified that when the defendant's coconspirator returned
from arraignment, he told the witness, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Id.
71. Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968).
72. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89.
73. See, e.g., Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1073 (1984); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1981).
74. 714 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
75. Id. at 243.
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say" because they are characterized "along with admissions as
'[s]tatements which are not hearsay' under Rule 801(d)(2). '" 76
Similarly, in United States v. Massa,77 the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that coconspirator statements are admissions rather than
an exception to the hearsay rule. The court also reasoned that
"[a]dmissions are not admitted because of confidence in their in-
herent reliability; rather, they are admitted because 'a party will
not be heard to object that s/he is unworthy of credence.' -78 Thus,
a less stringent admissibility standard was used under the cocon-
spirator exception than would be used under a confrontation
clause challenge.
The position taken by the courts in Massa and Ammar, although
creative, has questionable merit. The categorization of an out-of-
court statement as an exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence
usually does not control whether.the confrontation clause is impli-
cated.79 Instead, courts normally treat statements by coconspira-
tors as hearsay admissible under the admissions exception to the
hearsay rule.80
In determining whether the other hearsay exceptions constitute
firmly rooted exceptions under the Roberts reliability prong, the
federal appellate courts have relied on conclusory observations
rather than in-depth analysis. For instance, in Haggins v. Warden,
Fort Pillow State Farm,81 the Sixth Circuit addressed the excited
utterance exception and summarily decided: "The declarations fit
squarely within the parameters of a well-recognized and firmly-
rooted hearsay exception. . . .Thus, under Ohio v. Roberts, we
76. Id. at 255; see supra note 21 for the substance of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
77. 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
78. Id. (quoting Ammar, 714 F.2d at 255).
79. In Tennessee v. Street, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1985), the Court noted, "If the jury
had been asked to infer that [the witness'] confession proved that respondent participated
in the murder, then the evidence would have been hearsay; and because [the witness] was
not available for cross-examination, Confrontation Clause concerns would have been impli-
cated." Id. One could plausibly argue that by distinguishing between hearsay and nonhear-
say in this manner, the Court left open the possibility that the confrontation clause does not
apply to coconspirator statements at all because, like the rebutting testimony, these state-
ments are not considered hearsay.
However, in United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986), the Court appeared to fore-
close that argument: "Federal Rule of Evidence 801 characterizes out-of-court statements by
co-conspirators as exemptions from, rather than exceptions to, the hearsay rule. Whether
such statements are termed exemptions or exceptions, the same Confrontation Clause prin-
ciples apply." Id. at 1128 n.12.
80. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTREIN's EVIDENCE para. 801(d)(2)(01) (1985).
81. 715 F.2d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984).
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may infer that the statements carry sufficient indicia of reliability
to satisfy the policies protected by the confrontation clause."
The Eighth Circuit, in Lenza v. Wyrick, 2 used a similar per se
application without explanation. After discussing Roberts and de-
termining that the availability prong was satisfied, the court
stated: "In the present case the challenged testimony falls within
the 'state of mind' exception to the hearsay rule, and thus reliabil-
ity may be inferred." 8 This implies that reliability may be inferred
from hearsay admissible under any of the recognized hearsay ex-
ceptions and that the confrontation clause is no obstacle.
In Williams v. Melton,84 the Eleventh Circuit took a unique ap-
proach with regard to Georgia's res gestae exception. The court
quoted the language in Roberts which indicated that reliability can
be inferred when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. The court concluded, however, that "this language in
Roberts is only dicta because the Court did not find a firmly
rooted hearsay exception."8 Further, the court noted that "it
would be possible for a court to apply Georgia's firmly rooted res
gestae exception in an unconstitutional manner." 86 However, the
court ultimately admitted the evidence, stating that there was sub-
stantial circumstantial evidence which provided the needed indicia
of reliability.87
The court in United States v. H & M, Inc.88 skirted the classifi-
cation problem. After citing Roberts, the court stated that it "as-
sume[d], without deciding, that the statement against interest
hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted one, thus mandating use of
the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness test' in this
case."'89 Although this approach does not evince judicial decisive-
ness, the opportunity for constitutional infringement and reversal
was necessarily limited.
B. Florida's Application of the Confrontation Clause
Florida courts have also encountered difficulty in defining the
relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule.
82. 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 811.
84. 733 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
85. Id. at 1495 (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1496.
88. 562 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
89. Id. at 668 n.11.
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The courts, however, have not been faced with an abundance of
situations in which it was necessary to address the troublesome
relationship.
In State v. Basiliere,s0 a pre-Roberts case, the defendant, Ronald
Basiliere, had been charged with aggravated battery. Basiliere's at-
torney deposed the victim when Basiliere was not present; the vic-
tim subsequently died before the trial.9' The prosecution sought to
have the deposition introduced at trial, thereby prompting the trial
court to certify questions regarding the admissibility of the deposi-
tion testimony.92 The Florida Supreme Court found that the con-
frontation clause is violated when a trial court admits into evi-
dence a discovery deposition taken by the defendant's counsel
when the defendant was not present and the witness has become
unavailable."
Although the Roberts decision would arguably alter the result in
Basiliere, the Florida Supreme Court has declined to change its
position. For example, in State v. James," the Fifth District Court
of Appeal asked the Florida Supreme Court to decide whether
Roberts permitted a discovery deposition to be admitted into evi-
dence against a defendant when the defendant was present at the
deposition, or upon waiver of presence if the witness had become
unavailable to testify." James presented essentially the same fac-
tual situation as Basiliere in that the prosecution, due to the vic-
tim's death before trial, sought to introduce the victim's deposition
testimony taken by the defendant's attorney. The court decided
90. 353 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1977).
91. Id. at 821-22.
92. The trial court certified the following questions:
I. Whether the use of the deposition testimony at trial violates defendant's
confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and under Article I, Section 16, Florida Constitution, inasmuch as the de-
fendant was not present during the taking of the deposition by his attorney and
defendant received no notice that said deposition could be used at his trial.
II. Whether Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(d), which provides for discovery depositions
and says that they 'may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness,' yet does not provide, as
does the comparable Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.330(a)(3), for the use of said deposition as evi-
dence at trial upon a finding of unavailability of the witness, precludes the use of
the deposition testimony as evidence at trial upon the finding of unavailability of
the witness.
Id. at 822.
93. Id. at 823-25.
94. 402 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1981).
95. Id. at 1170.
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that criminal procedure rules9" precluded discovery depositions
from being used as substantive evidence in criminal trials; there-
fore, the court refused to rule on the allegation that the use of the
deposition violated the confrontation clause. 7
In Terrell v. State,98 the First District Court of Appeal applied
Basiliere and James to a case once again involving a prosecutor's
attempt to introduce a deposition as substantive evidence when
the witness was unavailable. Terrell, the defendant, appealed his
conviction for possession of illegal drugs alleging that the deposi-
tion of the informant-who had arranged and participated in the
96. The rules referred to by the court were FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d), which provides:
(d) Discovery Depositions. At any time after the filing of the indictment or
information the defendant may take the deposition upon oral examination of any
person who may have information relevant to the offense charged. The deposition
shall be taken in a building where the trial may be held, such other place agreed
upon by the parties or where the trial court may designate by special or general
order. The party taking the deposition shall give written notice to each other
party. The notice shall state the time and place the deposition is to be taken and
the name of each person to be examined. After notice to the parties the court may,
for good cause shown, extend or shorten the time and may change the place of
taking. Except as provided herein, the procedure for taking such deposition, in-
cluding the scope of the examination, shall be the same as that provided in the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Any deposition taken pursuant hereto may be
used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of
the deponent as a witness. The trial court or its clerk shall, upon application, issue
subpoenas for the persons whose depositions are to be taken. A resident of the
State may be required to attend an examination only in the county wherein he
resides, or is employed, or regularly transacts his business in person. A person who
refuses to obey a subpoena served upon him may be adjudged in contempt of the
court from which the subpoena issued[;]
and FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(), which provides in part:
0) Motion to Take Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony.
(1) After an indictment or information upon which a defendant is to be tried is
filed, the defendant or the State may apply for an order to perpetuate testimony.
The application shall be verified or supported by the affidavits of credible persons
that a prospective witness resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court
or may be unable to attend or be prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that
his testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposition to prevent
a failure of justice. The court shall order a commission to be issued to take the
deposition of the witnesses to be used in the trial and that any designated books,
papers, documents or tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same
time and place. If the application is made within ten days before the trial date,
the court may deny the application.
(2) If the defendant or the State desires to perpetuate the testimony of a wit-
ness living in or out of the State whose testimony is material and necessary to the
case, the same proceedings shall be followed as provided in the preceding subdivi-
sion, but the testimony of the witness may be taken before an official court re-
porter, transcribed by him and filed in the trial court.
97. James, 402 So. 2d at 1171.
98. 407 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
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drug transaction-should not be admitted into evidence. The court
refused to admit the deposition, not on confrontation grounds, but
because it failed to comply with Florida's criminal procedure
rules.99 The court reasoned that the statutory exception for former
testimony recognizes the necessity for meeting the procedural re-
quirements because it provides that the deposition must be
"'taken in compliance with law.'-lo Thus, the court concluded
that the evidence must satisfy procedural requirements before any
hearsay or confrontation issues arise.
Probably the most common situation in which confrontation
problems arise in Florida involves the statements of coconspirators
or codefendants. The Florida Supreme Court most recently ad-
dressed this issue in Nelson v. State.101 In Nelson, the trial court
had admitted into evidence under the statement against interest
exception taped conversations of codefendants incriminating the
defendant.102 In reversing the trial court, the supreme court noted
that the clear language of the statutory hearsay exception pre-
cluded the tape's admission. Further, the court observed that be-
cause defense counsel could not cross-examine a tape recording,
"[t]he admission of a confession of a codefendant who does not
take the stand deprives a defendant of his rights under the sixth
amendment confrontation clause."103 Finally, the court decided
that the prosecution had not established an adequate predicate in
order to introduce the evidence under the coconspirator exception,
thereby obviating the need to address the confrontation clause.""
In Priestly v. State,0 5 the Fourth District Court of Appeal was
faced with a confrontation clause challenge to hearsay otherwise
admissible under the coconspirator exception. Darrell Priestly and
his son appealed their convictions for trafficking and conspiring to
traffic in marijuana. They argued that the trial court erroneously
admitted tape recordings of a coconspirator's incriminating conver-
99. Id. at 1041. The rule referred to by the court was FLA. R. CriM. P. 3.220(d), see supra
note 96. The court remarked that James and Basiliere "reach[ed] the unequivocal conclu-
sion that a deposition taken pursuant to Rule 3.220(d) may be used for impeachment pur-
poses only." Terrell, 407 So. 2d at 1041.
100. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(a) (1981)).
101. 490 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1986).
102. Id. at 34. The statement against interest exception provides in part: "A statement
or confession which is offered against the accused in a criminal action, and which is made by
a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this
exception." FLA. STAT. § 90.804(2)(c) (1985).
103. Nelson, 490 So. 2d at 34 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 35.
105. 450 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
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sations. 106 The court acknowledged that "[tihere was no clearcut
answer to the question whether a statement of a coconspirator ad-
missible under the Federal Rules of Evidence is inadmissible be-
cause of the Confrontation Clause. 1 07 However, without any dis-
cussion other than recitation of the holding in an analogous federal
case, the court decided that no confrontation right was violated by
admitting the evidence.108
In Maugeri v. State,10 9 the Third District Court of Appeal was
also faced with a confrontation clause challenge to testimony ad-
mitted under the statement against interest exception. The de-
fendant, Joseph Maugeri, appealed his first-degree murder and
burglary convictions, alleging that the trial court should have disal-
lowed the victim's live-in girlfriend's testimony. She testifed that
the victim had told her that he had stolen two kilograms of cocaine
from Maugeri's airplane. Maugeri had claimed that only cash had
been stolen.110 In its confrontation clause analysis, the court stated
that "[e]ven though the hearsay statement may pass muster under
the statutory rule of evidence, it must also survive the constitu-
tional scrutiny of the sixth amendment." '
In rejecting the per se finding of admissibility the court in
Maugeri agreed with the Washington Supreme Court's observation
that "'inculpatory statements are a 'firmly rooted exception' [and
therefore generally admissible] if we add the proviso that they
must be accompanied by corroborating circumstances clearly indi-
cating their trustworthiness.' ,,12 This rather confusing analysis ex-
emplifies the awkwardness with which state courts have dealt with
the confrontation problem. The primary defect in this analysis lies
in the court mixing the firmly rooted language with a type of par-
ticularized guarantee of trustworthiness analysis. The Court in
Roberts never intended to require a trustworthiness analysis for
evidence submitted under a firmly rooted exception. Either an ex-
106. Id. at 290-91.
107. Id. at 291.
108. The case the court cited was United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), wherein the Sixth Circuit "held that the admission into
evidence under the federal coconspirator rule of a tape containing a conversation between
two of three conspirators did not violate the constitutional right to confrontation of the
third conspirator." Priestly, 450 So. 2d at 291.
109. 460 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
110. Id. at 976.
111. Id. at 977-78.
112. Id. at 978 (quoting State v. Parris, 654 P.2d 77, 81 (Wash. 1982)).
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ception is firmly rooted resulting in presumed reliability, or it is
not firmly rooted, necessitating a trustworthiness analysis.
In summary, Florida courts have not developed a practical anal-
ysis for dealing with the relationship between the confrontation
clause and hearsay testimony. Basiliere still controls in the area of
depositions serving as prior testimony. The subsequent decision in
Roberts could have justifiably altered the result in Basiliere, but
the Florida Supreme Court has not so held. Thus, the procedural
hurdle of perpetuating the deposition testimony must first be
cleared before a confrontation analysis is proper. '
The admissibility of evidence under the other hearsay exceptions
vis a vis the confrontation clause remains uncertain. Unfortu-
nately, the analysis in cases like James and Maugeri does not serve
as a solid basis for predictability. Thus, Florida courts will likely
continue to apply their unorthodox, if not incorrect, confrontation
analysis until the United States Supreme Court develops a more
thorough mode of analysis which the Florida Supreme Court or
legislature will adopt.
III. United States v. Inadi
In 1986, the Supreme Court in United States v. Inadi'" nar-
rowed the range of cases to which the Roberts unavailability prong
applies. Joseph Inadi had been convicted of conspiring to manufac-
ture and distribute methamphetamine. Over Inadi's objection, the
trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce tape recorded
statements made by Michael McKeon, an unindicted cocon-
spirator, during telephone conversations with others involved in
the conspiracy.115 Inadi appealed, arguing that the prosecution had
failed to establish the declarant's unavailability as required by the
confrontation clause.11 6
The Third Circuit reversed the trial court decision, holding that
the prosecution must satisfy the Roberts unavailability prong as a
condition to admission of statements that otherwise were admissi-
113. Although conceptually attractive because it serves as a safeguard, the procedural
requirement is difficult to satisfy in daily situations. Neither party supposedly anticipates
the unavailability of a witness, and thus procedural perpetuation of the deposition testi-
mony normally does not occur. Consequently, the testimony is barred even though neither
party had reason to believe that the perpetuation procedure was necessary.
114. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
115. Id. at 1124.
116. Id.
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ble under the coconspirator exception. 1 7 The court, relying on
Roberts, held that the prosecution "bears the burden of producing
the coconspirator-declarants or proving that they are
unavailable. " "i
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and effectively
limited Roberts to its facts.1"9 By limiting the Roberts confronta-
tion clause analysis to hearsay offered under the former testimony
exception, the Court rejected the broader construction given to
Roberts by the federal circuits."10 The Court declared that "Rob-
erts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that
no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government
without a showing that the declarant is unavailable."' 1 The Court
reasoned that the unavailability rule would not produce much tes-
timony that promotes the truth-determining process, and such a
rule would not actually exclude evidence unless the prosecution
mistakenly did not produce an otherwise available declarant."'
The Court further reasoned that an unavailability requirement
would be useless in promoting the purposes of the confrontation
clause if the prosecution does not want to call the coconspirator
and the defense had not chosen to subpoena the witness.'2 s How-
ever, the language of the confrontation clause apparently does not
support this rationale because by shifting the burden of production
to the accused, the hearsay declarant technically becomes a witness
for rather than against the accused." Shifting the burden also
makes confrontation an opportunity rather than a right as pro-
vided in the sixth amendment. Further, as Justice Marshall
pointed out in his dissent, when a defendant calls the declarant as
117. United States v. Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1121
(1986).
118. Id. at 819; see supra text accompanying note 17.
119. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1124, 1129.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
121. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1126.
122. Id. at 1127.
123. Id. at 1128.
124. As Professor Westen explained:
What distinguishes a witness "against" the accused from a witness "in his favor"
is not the content of the witness' testimony but the identity of the party relying
on his evidence. A person is a witness "against" the accused if he is one whose
statements the prosecution relies upon in court in its effort to convict the accused
.... Conversely, witnesses "in his favor" are all the remaining witnesses whom a
defendant wishes to examine after the prosecution has confronted him with its
witnesses.
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Crimi-
nal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567, 604-05 (1978) (emphasis in original).
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his own witness in federal prosecutions, he is handicapped in that
the defendant has no right "to obtain any prior statements of that
declarant in the government's possession. '12 5
In summary, the Court has apparently limited the Roberts con-
frontation clause analysis to hearsay offered under the former tes-
timony exception. The Court definitely decided that evidence
under the coconspirator exception need not satisfy an unavailabil-
ity requirement. However, an uncertain relationship remains be-
tween the confrontation clause and the other hearsay exceptions.
A. Reliability Requirement After Inadi
One problem lingering after Inadi concerns the uncertainty of
when the reliability of testimony sought to be introduced under a
hearsay exception can be presumed and when the proponent must
show particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Thus, the four
exceptions expressly recognized as "firmly rooted" in Roberts re-
main the only authority on the issue.12 6 Even though the recogni-
tion of these exceptions was dicta, with so much uncertainty re-
maining in this area, courts will likely embrace any guidance the
Supreme Court offers.127 Consequently, until the Supreme Court
makes a definitive statement as to what constitutes a firmly rooted
exception, courts will differ as to which hearsay exceptions qualify.
Predicting the Supreme Court's resolution of this problem is not
an easy task, considering the paucity of opinions to serve as a basis
for speculation. One approach would be to determine an excep-
tion's classification based on the length of time that the exception
has been recognized. One cannot, however, rely on longevity alone
because the business records exception was not recognized at com-
mon law,125 yet the Court in Roberts cited it as a firmly rooted
exception.129
Another possibility, considering the composition of the present
Court, is to recognize as firmly rooted all the exceptions expressly
enumerated in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, no particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness would be required. This possi-
125. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1134 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982)).
126. These exceptions are dying declarations, cross-examined testimony, business
records, and public records. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8; see also text accompanying note 60.
127. As Professor Lilly has noted: "Whether 'firm-rooting' is a function of the longevity
of an exception, the number of jurisdictions recognizing it, or both is not certain." Lilly,
Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 207, 228 (1984).
128. Johnson v. Lutz, 170 N.E. 517, 519 (N.Y. 1930).
129. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
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bility appears very plausible when considering judicial efficiency
because courts would not need to engage in a reliability analysis
and another avenue of appeal would be eliminated.
Such a rule, however, appears contrary to the rationale underly-
ing the presumed reliability of a firmly rooted exception. The illus-
trative exceptions given by the Court in Roberts are all recognized
as being based on reliability. 30 All hearsay exceptions are not,
however, based on reliability."' For example, the coconspirator ex-
ception is based on the legal fiction of an agency relationship be-
tween the coconspirators. 32 To presume reliability under this ex-
ception would further extend the legal fiction and arguably
encroach on sixth amendment and due process rights." 3
After Inadi, federal courts faced with confrontation challenges to
testimony admitted under the coconspirator exception have uni-
formly analyzed the testimony's reliability and have rejected the
notion that the coconspirator exception is firmly rooted. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Pecora,3" after acknowledging the effect of
Inadi on the unavailability rule, the Third Circuit noted that
"[t]he reliability requirement is separate and distinct from an
availability requirement. '""8  Further, the court stated that
"[c]oconspirator statements do not possess the special trustworthi-
ness characteristic of evidence falling within a 'firmly rooted hear-
say exception.' ""0 Other courts have agreed," 7 thus the Supreme
Court would have to once again disregard the majority of the cir-
130. Id. at 66.
131. After addressing the reliability of several hearsay exceptions one commentator
noted: "Excited utterances, present sense impressions, statements of a then existing mental
or physical condition, and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis (not treatment) do
not carry the same indicia of reliability as the above described categories." Stewart, Percep-
tion, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1, 25-26.
132. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note.
133. In addressing the questionable reliability of coconspirator statements, one author
has noted:
When measuring the reliability of coconspirator statements in terms of sincerity,
ambiguity, perception and memory, it becomes obvious that the coconspirator ex-
ception is not "firmly rooted." Because they have a special incentive to shift
blame to one another, coconspirators are likely to bend the truth of their state-
ments. They are also likely to speak in code words or names that make the identi-
fication of their meaning or subject matter ambiguous.
Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and the Confrontation Clause: Closing the
Window of Admissibility for Coconspirator Hearsay, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1291, 1311 (1985)
(footnote omitted).
134. 798 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 627.
136. Id. at 628 (citations omitted).
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cuits to hold that all the Federal Rules exceptions are firmly
rooted.
B. The Unavailability Rule After Inadi
The Supreme Court is unlikely to extend the unavailability rule
beyond the limits already fixed by the hearsay rules. Although the
Court may not choose to confine the confrontation clause to the
unavailability rules governing the hearsay exceptions, the rationale
underlying the Inadi decision strongly suggests that the Court is
willing to allow the Federal Rules of Evidence to define the scope
of confrontation rights.188
For example, in Inadi the Court reasoned that the coconspirator
and former testimony exceptions did not warrant the same treat-
ment under the unavailability rule; this distinction was impliedly
acknowledged by the drafters of the Rules in commenting on the
two exceptions.13 9 Both Inadi and the drafters, when addressing
the former testimony exception, emphasized the importance of the
opportunity to observe the declarant's demeanor during the pro-
ceeding and especially on cross-examination. '0 The Court then
pointed out that the same objectives are not promoted by the un-
availability rule because "it is extremely unlikely that in-court tes-
timony will recapture the evidentiary significance of statements
made when the conspiracy was operating in full force." 4
In practically every case involving a confrontation clause chal-
lenge to evidence submitted under a hearsay exception, the Court
could easily resort to its analysis in Inadi. In other words, the
Court could accept the reasoning of the Rules drafters as to their
categorization of the exception at issue under the unavailability
rule. 142
137. See United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 985 (1st Cir. 1986) (court implies that a
reliability analysis is required); United States v. Ward, 793 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Szabo, 789 F.2d 1484, 1487 (10th Cir. 1986).
138. In addressing the possibility of equating the confrontation clause with the hearsay
rule, one commentator noted: "The obvious difficulty with this construction is that it per-
mits the law of evidence to dictate the reach of a parallel constitutional provision. The re-
sulting anomaly is that the scope of constitutional protection is placed in the hands of
judges and legislators who fashion the hearsay exception." Lilly, supra note 127, at 210.
139. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee note.
140. Id.; Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1126.
141. Id. at 1126-27.
142. A difficulty would remain in dealing with the unavailability rule when applied to
the "catch all" exceptions. See FED. R. Ev. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Both the rule requiring
unavailability and the rule declaring availability immaterial contain these residuary excep-
tions. Thus, a comprehensive decision that the unavailability rule should or should not ap-
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Another reason suggesting that the Court will follow the lead of
the Rules drafters is that it had the opportunity in Inadi to em-
brace the Roberts two-pronged test as the norm in confrontation
clause analysis, but declined to do so. In fact, the Court took great
pains to emphasize that in Roberts it "ha[d] not sought to 'map
out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the
validity of all . ..hearsay "exceptions".' "143 However, the Inadi
Court could have just as easily quoted from Roberts that the un-
availability rule applied in the "usual case." '44 Alternatively, the
Court could have quoted the prefatory remark in Roberts that "[it
had been asked] to consider once again the relationship between
the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule with its many
exceptions."' 45
These factors, combined with the prevailing ideological and ju-
risprudential persuasion of the present Court, suggest that the con-
frontation clause will not limit the admission of evidence submit-
ted under the hearsay exceptions beyond the unavailability
requirements of the Federal Rules. This result is likely even
though the Court has declined to find that the hearsay rule and
the confrontation clause have merged into a single rule requiring
the same analysis. 14" The Court in Inadi had the opportunity to
adopt the Roberts test in determining confrontation challenges.
The clear implication from Inadi is that the confrontation clause
ply would render one of the residuary exceptions superfluous. See Kirkpatrick, Confronta-
tion and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70
MINN. L. REV. 665, 691 n.132 (1986).
One possible solution would be to examine prior case law and determine how other courts
have dealt with similar cases and apply the rule accordingly. This approach assumes that
analogous precedents exist which is not necessarily correct.
A more realistic approach, assuming no applicable precedent, would be to determine with
what exception the proffered evidence most closely complies and apply the unavailability
rule of that exception. This approach necessarily involves ad hoc determinations, but the
drafters surely contemplated some difficulty when they included the residuary exceptions.
143. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1125 (citation omitted).
144. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
145. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
146. In fact, in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court acknowledged that
the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule were based largely on the same interests, but
warned against identical analytical application of the two.
The Court stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing
to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is noth-
ing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as
they existed historically at common law.
Id. at 155.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
has very limited applicability once the requirements of the hearsay
exceptions are satisfied.
IV. CONCLUSION
The full effect of the Inadi decision has not yet been deter-
mined. As confrontation challenges rise through the judicial system
testing the parameters of Inadi, courts should carefully consider
the damaging consequences that could result from further weaken-
ing the confrontation clause. Due process protections are jeopard-
ized whenever courts diminish the right of confrontation.
To preserve due process safeguards, courts should follow the
lead of decisions like Pecora and continue applying the reliability
prong of the Roberts test to evidence offered under the hearsay
exceptions, including the coconspirator exception." 7  Further,
courts should assure that those values embodied in the unavailabil-
ity requirement are not subordinated to facilitate judicial
efficiency.
Inadi stops just short of declaring that in most contexts once
evidence satisfies the hearsay exception requirements, no confron-
tation issue exists. However, equating the constitutional right of
confrontation with the hearsay rules would render superfluous a
significant portion of the sixth amendment, a result that would
come close to eliminating one of the basic rights an accused person
has traditionally enjoyed in American courts.
147. As one commentator observed: "[Tihe confrontation clause's standard of reliability
closely approximates that which is independently operative through the due process clause."
Lilly, supra note 127, at 224 (footnote omitted). Because the confrontation clause and due
process clause protections are so similar, courts should not relax the confrontation clause to
the point of infringing on due process rights.
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